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settlements between the debtor and other prepetition unsecured creditors can unduly harm their 
interests in the absence of proper judicial discretion.  A question has arisen as to what standard 
bankruptcy judges must follow in deciding whether to approve a trustee’s Rule 9019 settlement 
proposal over the objection of other unsecured creditors.  A separate question has also arisen 
about whether a bankruptcy judge can ever approve a settlement when it adversely affects rights 
of parties not involved in the settlement negotiations.5  Part I of this article defines the standards 
set out by the Supreme Court and Second Circuit which limit a bankruptcy judge’s discretion.  
Part II discusses the issue of whether a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it approves a 
settlement that adversely affects the rights of parties not involved in the settlement negotiations 
for a proposed Rule 9019 settlement.   
I. General Standards for the Approval of a Settlement  
A. The Supreme Court’s Fair and Equitable Standard 
The purpose of Rule 9019 is to “to prevent the making of concealed agreements that are 
unknown to the creditors and unevaluated by the court.”6  The court must learn “all facts 
necessary for an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should 
the claim be litigated,” and to “make an informed and independent judgment as to whether a 
proposed compromise is “fair and equitable.”7  The Supreme Court has instructed that a 
bankruptcy judge should form an educated estimate of the “complexity, expense, likely duration 
of such litigation, the possible difficulties of collecting on any judgment which might be 
obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the 
proposed compromise.”8  While the court clearly has an obligation to investigate the factual 
situation, it is not necessary for the court to conduct a “mini-trial” of the facts or the merits 
                                               
5 In re Miami Metals I, Inc., 603 BR 531, 531 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019).   
6 See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 461 (quoting In re Masters, Inc., 141 B.R. at 16). 
7 See Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968). 
8 Id.   
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underlying the dispute being settled.9  Rather, the court should "canvass the issues and see 
whether the settlement fall[s] below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness.”10  
B. The Fair and Equitable Standard and its Connection to Section 
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code 
Both the Fifth and Second Circuits interpreted the phrase “fair and equitable” to be 
derived from section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy 
Code”), which describes the conditions under which a plan of reorganization may be approved 
notwithstanding the objections of an impaired class of creditors, a situation known as a 
“cramdown.”11  The implication from this interpretation is that “a settlement presented for 
approval as part of a plan of reorganization, because it constitutes part of the plan, may only be 
approved if it, too, is ‘fair and equitable’ in the sense of conforming to the absolute priority 
rule.”12  The absolute priority rule holds that senior creditors must be paid in full before junior 
creditors are paid, unless the senior creditors consent to subordinate some of their claims to said 
unsecured creditors.13   
However, when a settlement is presented outside of a reorganization plan, section 1129 is 
not implicated by statutory language.  In order to provide all unsecured creditors proper 
protection in both pre-plan and in-plan settlements, both the Fifth and Second Circuits have 
articulated tests that reflect the importance of the absolute priority rule in a bankruptcy judge’s 
fairness and equitability analysis.14  While the Fifth Circuit requires that the absolute priority rule 
apply to pre-plan settlements, the Second Circuit found that approach to be too rigid and denied 
                                               
9 In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 327 B.R. 143, 158 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
10 In re WT. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1983). 
11 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 462; 11 USC § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“the holder of any claim or interest 
that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or 
interest any property, except that in a case in which the debtor is an individual, the debtor may retain property 
included in the estate under section 1115, subject to the requirements of subsection (a)(14) of this section.”). 
12 See TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424; In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 463.   
13 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
14 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 463-65. 
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to adopt a per se rule, even though that same court noted that rejection of a per se rule creates a 
heightened risk that the parties to a settlement may engage in “improper collusion.”15   
C. The Fifth Circuit’s Rigid Per Se Rule 
 The Fifth Circuit recognized that “[w]ithout the requirement that [out of plan] settlements 
conform to the absolute priority rule, only the bankruptcy court's invocation of Rule 9019 factors 
would protect the interests of any nonsignatory intermediate or impaired creditors.”16  In an 
effort to mitigate this concern, it adopted a per se rule where the “absolute priority rule should 
also apply to pre-plan settlements, concluding that ‘a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion in 
approving a [pre-plan] settlement with a junior creditor unless the court concludes that priority of 
payment will be respected as to objecting senior creditors.’”17  The ruling requires strict 
adherence to the absolute priority rule, and therefore, “a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion in 
approving a settlement with a junior creditor unless the court concludes that priority of payment 
will be respected as to objecting senior creditors.”18 The court reasoned that if the standard 
had no application before confirmation of a reorganization plan, then bankruptcy courts would 
have the discretion to favor junior classes of creditors so long as the approval of the settlement 
came before the plan.19   
D. The Second Circuit’s Less Rigid Seven Factor Test 
 In In re Iridium Operating LLC, the Second Circuit held that a bankruptcy court may 
approve a settlement that does not fully comply with the absolute priority rule if other factors 
weigh in favor of approval and the parties give sufficient justification.20  In a chapter 11 case, 
whether a settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority 
                                               
15 Id. at 464. 
16 Id. at 463.   
17 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984).   
18 Id. at 298.   
19 Id. 
20 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 465. 
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requirements is the most important factor in deciding whether a settlement is fair and equitable, 
although it is not dispositive.21  A creditor’s committee has a fiduciary duty to maximize 
recovery of an estate’s assets, and if in pursuit of that duty it reaches a settlement that in some 
way impairs the rule of priorities, then it must state “specific and credible grounds to justify the 
deviation.”22  
With this policy of judicial deference in mind, the court articulated seven factors that 
must be considered in analyzing the fairness and equitability of a proposed settlement.  Those 
factors are: (1) the balance between the litigation's possibility of success and the settlement's 
future benefits; (2) the likelihood of complex and protracted litigation, “with its attendant 
expense, inconvenience, and delay,” including the difficulty in collecting on the judgment; (3) 
“the paramount interests of the creditors,” including each affected class's relative benefits “and 
the degree to which creditors either do not object to or affirmatively support the proposed 
settlement”; (4) whether the parties in interest support the proposed settlement; (5) the 
“competency and experience of counsel” supporting, and “[t]he experience and knowledge of the 
bankruptcy court judge” reviewing the settlement;  (6) “the nature and breadth of releases to be 
obtained by officers and directors”; and (7) “the extent to which the settlement is the product of 
arm's length bargaining.”23  
In In re Iridium, a former subsidiary of Motorola, Inc. (“Motorola”), Iridium Operating 
LCC (“Iridium”), filed for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.24  There, a group 
of lenders represented by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Lenders”), asserted liens over most of 
the assets that Iridium still owned.25  However, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 
                                               
21 Id. at 464.   
22 Id. at 466. 
23 Id. at 462 (quoting In re WorldCom, Inc., 347 B.R. 123, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
24 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 456. 
25 Id.   
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("Committee") contested those liens, and especially objected to the Lenders’ claim to the 
remaining cash in Iridium’s Chase accounts.26  The Committee also attempted to pursue 
litigation against Motorola, Iridium’s former parent company, but did not have the funds.27 
Ultimately, the Committee and the Lenders negotiated a pre-plan settlement (the “Settlement”).28  
The Settlement’s terms included concession of the liens, distribution of estate cash to the 
Lenders, as well as distribution of cash to fund a litigation vehicle (“ILLLC”) designed to sue 
Motorola.29  Motorola was an administrative creditor and objected on the grounds that the 
Settlement would distribute estate property to lower priority creditors before any payments were 
made to Motorola.30  The bankruptcy court approved the settlement, holding that it was “fair, 
reasonable, and in the best interests of the estate,” even though it violated the absolute priority 
rule.31  Motorola subsequently appealed to the district court, and the District Court reversed.32  
With regard to the first two factors, the District Court favored the Settlement because it 
determined that litigation was unlikely to be successful for the estate and that the Settlement 
offered far more benefits.  Furthermore, the litigation would be complex and drawn out and 
would cost the parties more than if they agreed to settle.33  Essentially, with litigation being an 
expensive venture which offered little reward, the first two factors weighed in favor of approving 
the Settlement.34  The third and fourth factors required the court to evaluate the creditors’ 
interests as well as their amenability to the proposed Settlement.  The court recognized that every 
                                               
26 Id.   
27 Id.   
28 Id. at 458.   
29 Id. at 459.   
30 Id.   
31 Id. at 460.   
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 465.   
34 Id.   
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creditor except Motorola was in favor of the Settlement, which indicated that creditors believed 
the Settlement was in their interests.35   
With respect to the fifth and seventh factors, counsel on both sides, as well as the 
bankruptcy court judge, are competent and experienced, and the Settlement was “negotiated in 
good faith and at arms-length by the parties.”36  When counsel is effective and the settlement is 
negotiated in good faith, the court is more likely to look favorably upon a settlement, as it further 
supports factors (3) and (4).37  However, the court noted that while not dispositive, whether the 
settlement’s terms adhere to the absolute priority rule is extremely important in determining 
whether the settlement is fair and equitable.38  Furthermore, a creditor’s committee has a 
fiduciary duty to maximize recovery of an estate’s assets, and if in pursuit of that duty it reaches 
a settlement that in some way impairs the rule of priorities, then it must state “specific and 
credible grounds to justify the deviation.”39  Here, the Settlement would not have adhered to the 
rule of absolute priority and the Creditor’s Committee who would benefit most from the 
settlement could not provide the court with any reasoning for why they should be allowed to 
deviate from the rule of priorities.40  Even though almost all of the factors weighed in favor of 
approving the Settlement (including near unanimous support), the fact that the Settlement did not 
adhere to the rule of priorities pushed the court to remand the case for clarification of why the 
Settlement requires a deviation from the rule.   
II. Rule 9019 Requires Settlements to be Fair and Equitable to Non-Settling Parties 
‘‘Where the rights of one who is not a party to a settlement are at stake, the fairness of the 
settlement to the settling parties is not enough to earn the judicial stamp of approval . . .  [I]f 
                                               
35 Id. 
36 Id.   
37 The court did not do a factor (6) analysis.  
38 Id.   
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 467.   
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third parties complain to a judge that a decree will be inequitable because it will harm them 
unjustly, he cannot just brush their complaints aside.’’41  Notwithstanding the factors set out in In 
re Iridium, the Second Circuit has made it clear “that when the rights of non-settling parties are 
implicated by the terms of a settlement, the court cannot approve it without considering the 
interests of those non-settling parties.”42  
In In re Miami Metals I, Inc., a New York bankruptcy court held that a settlement could 
not be approved because it adversely affected rights of non-parties thereto.43  In that case, Miami 
Metals I, Inc. filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.44  
The official committee of unsecured creditors (the “Creditors’ Committee”) and the senior 
lenders agreed on terms of a settlement, which required entry into a plan support agreement 
(“PSA”).45  Thereafter, the debtors, the Creditors’ Committee and senior lenders requested 
bankruptcy court approval of the settlement under Rule 9019.46  A separate group of unsecured 
creditors who were not part of the Creditors’ Committee and therefore not signatories to the PSA 
objected to confirm the settlement and PSA.47   
The In re Miami court denied the motion to approve the PSA because of: (i) the potential 
prejudice to the unsigned parties’ rights, and (ii) the timing of the benefits under the settlement.48  
First, the PSA was premised on a plan of reorganization (“Plan”) that would create a reserve of 
all proceeds generated by the sale of precious-metal inventory other than undisputed collateral.  
Although there were monies earmarked on reserve to distribute to the unsigned parties as 
ownership disputes were resolved, the PSA  imposed a cap on the recovery of customers holding 
                                               
41 In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig., 957 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992). 
42Stanwich Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Pardee (In re Stanwich Fin. Servs. Corp.), 377 B.R. 432, 437 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007
) (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 995 F.2d 1138, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1993). 
43 In re Miami Metals I, Inc., 603 B.R. at 531. 
44 Id.   
45 Id.   
46 Id. at 532.   
47 Id.   
48 Id. at 532.   
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ownership claims of the precious metals (the “Customers”); a cap that could have been 
inadequate if the Customers prevailed on their ownership claims of the precious metals.49  The 
PSA did not provide for any cap on the Creditors’ Committee’s recovery.50  Second, the court 
was concerned about the timing of the benefits under the Settlement because certain benefit 
features were triggered automatically, whereas others would have only been triggered if the Plan 
was confirmed.51  Effectively, the Settlement ensured that Senior Lenders would reap the full 
benefit of the PSA on the effective date of the Settlement, regardless of whether the Plan was 
confirmed, while the unsigned parties' benefits were contingent on the Plan becoming effective.52 
Accordingly, the court rejected the Settlement and Plan because neither would be “fair and 
equitable” to the Customers under Rule 9019.  The court decided that the non-settling parties 
would be unduly harmed by the implications of the Settlement and declined to approve it or to 
even do a full In re Iridium analysis.   
Conclusion 
 Determining whether a Rule 9019 settlement proposal is fair and equitable requires an in 
depth balancing test that ultimately relies on significant judicial discretion.  While bankruptcy 
courts must follow the Supreme Court’s fair and equitable language, the Second and Fifth 
Circuits set out materially different tests.  While the Fifth Circuit has enforced a per se absolute 
priority rule for pre-plan settlements in the chapter 11 context, the Second Circuit has taken a 
less firm approach, allowing further judicial discretion through a seven-factor balancing test set 
forth in In re Iridium.  Still, deviation from the absolute priority rule is not looked upon 
favorably by bankruptcy courts, and parties who seek to do so much provide the court with a 
convincing reason.  Finally, when the rights of parties not involved in settlement negotiations are 
                                               
49 Id.   
50 Id.    
51 Id.  
52 Id.   
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adversely affected, a bankruptcy court must protect the rights of those objecting unsecured 
creditors and cannot simply ignore their interests.  A settlement must be fair and equitable to 
non-settling parties as well. 
 
